Able Danger

[Sean Osborne]

Able Danger, the 9/11 Commission & the Strange (But Now Explainable) Actions of Sandy Berger

By Sean Osborne, Senior Analyst & Military Affairs Expert

& Douglas J. Hagmann,Director

10 August 2005: Hey America… do you remember the strange actions of President Clinton’s national security adviser Sandy Berger during the 9/11 Commission investigation when he removed highly classified terrorism documents that should have been turned over to that independent commission? Did you ever wonder what Berger was attempting to hide and even more importantly, why? Did you also wonder why, even though he committed a felony, he received nothing more than a slap on the wrist while various political and intelligence officials played down his actions, wanting them to disappear as quickly as possible? It appears that we just might have discovered the answers to these and other troubling questions: Able Danger.

Able Danger is the code name of a secret team of U.S. Army military intelligence operatives created in 1999 under a directive signed by General Henry H. Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to assemble information about al Qaeda networks around the world. In mid-2000, the Able Danger team discovered the existence of the key 9/11 terror cell of Mohammed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawar al-Hamzi inside the U.S. and recommended to their military superiors that the FBI be called in to “take out that cell,” according to Representative Curt Weldon, the Pennsylvania House member and vice chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. That information was presented in the summer of 2000 in the form of a chart complete with photographs of the terrorists to the Pentagon's Special Operations Command headquarters in Tampa, Florida. Our intelligence was dead-on accurate, but was not acted upon a full year before the 9/11 attacks.

In fact, Representative Weldon said Able Danger members had recommended that the information they uncovered be shared with the FBI, but the idea was rejected and they “were directed to take those 3M yellow stickers and place them over the faces of Atta and the other terrorists and pretend they didn’t exist.”

Despite the findings of Able Danger, absolutely no action was pursued to take out the cell during the weeks leading up to the 2000 presidential election, said Weldon. The reason? Mohammed Atta possessed a “green card” at the time. Under the rules of the Clinton Justice Department, lawyers working for Special Operations decided that anyone holding a green card had to be granted essentially the same legal protections as any U.S. citizen. They did not want to recommend that the FBI go after someone holding a green card, Weldon told his House colleagues on June 27, 2005 during a speech, known as a “special order,” which he delivered on the House floor. Defense Department lawyers were also said to be reluctant to suggest a bold action by FBI agents after the bureau’s disastrous 1993 strike against the Branch Davidian religious cult in Waco, Texas.

Read Curt Weldon’s June 27, 2005 Testimony This week, Representative Weldon and a former defense intelligence official said they had spoken with three Able Danger team members, all still working in the government, including two in the military, and that they were consistent in asserting that Mohammed Atta's affiliation with a Qaeda terrorism cell in the United States was known within the Defense Department by mid-2000 but was not acted upon. Further and after the fact, the 9-11 Commission was reportedly never told about Able Danger or its findings.

Enter Sandy Berger – During the 9/11 Commission

While the investigation by the 9/11 Commission was in progress, Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger, who served as Clinton's national security adviser for all of President's Clinton’s second term, was caught removing documents from the national Archives – the very same documents that should have been turned over to the independent commission probing the September 11, 2001, terror attacks. Berger ultimately admitted to intentionally taking and destroying various classified documents relating to terrorism collected under the Clinton administration. Berger and his lawyer said on July 19, 2004 that he knowingly removed the handwritten notes by placing them in his jacket, pants and socks, and also “inadvertently” took copies of actual classified documents in a leather portfolio. Those documents reportedly included an assessment of America's terror vulnerabilities at airports, something very relevant to Able Danger’s findings and key to the 9/11 attacks. What Sandy Berger did was a felony, yet was allowed a generous plea agreement of a fine and a three-year suspension of his security clearance.

Under the prism of Able Danger, we are now able to make sense out of the previously curious actions of Sandy Berger.

Able Danger & the Saga of the 9/11 Commission; Warren Commission Redux

According to Weldon, staff members of the 9/11 Commission were briefed on the findings of the Able Danger intelligence unit within the Special Operations Command and about the specific recommendation to break up the Mohammed Atta cell, yet those members reportedly decided not to brief the commission’s members on those matters. Why not?

Clearer now is the conflict of interest of having Jamie Gorelick, the Assistant Attorney General under Bill Clinton serving on the 9/11 Commission. Ms. Gorelick worked directly for Janet Reno and was directly involved in matters that were under review by the 9/11 Commission.

Remember the reason the findings of Able Danger were not acted upon? In his testimony before the 9/11 Commission, Attorney General John Ashcroft stated the following:

"In 1995, the Justice Department embraced flawed legal reasoning, imposing a series of restrictions on the FBI that went beyond what the law required," he said. "The 1995 Guidelines and the procedures developed around them imposed draconian barriers to communications between the law enforcement and intelligence communities. The wall left intelligence agents afraid to talk with criminal prosecutors or agents. In 1995, the Justice Department designed a system destined to fail."

Continuing his testimony, Ashcroft stated:

"Somebody built this wall.” Ashcroft added: "The basic architecture for the wall . . . was contained in a classified memorandum entitled 'Instructions on Separation of Certain Foreign Counterintelligence and Criminal Investigations. Full disclosure compels me to inform you that its author is a member of this Commission."

Ashcroft was referring to Jamie Gorelick, who served as Deputy Attorney General in the Clinton Administration as well as general counsel at the Department of Defense. Both jobs put her at the very center of the former administration's anti-terrorism efforts. Consequently, her actions, as well as those of her superiors, were the subject of review by the very commission on which she is a member. Most assuredly, that is a huge conflict of interest. In her position at the Justice Department, Gorelick wrote a memo that provides a picture of the role she played setting policy for intelligence gathering and sharing during the Clinton Administration. The memo stemmed from the Justice Department's prosecution of the 1993 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center.

Gorelick wrote in 1995:

“During the course of those investigations, significant counterintelligence information has been developed related to the activities and plans of agents of foreign powers operating in this country and overseas, including previously unknown connections between separate terrorist groups." We believe that it is prudent to establish a set of instructions that will clearly separate the counterintelligence investigation from the more limited, but continued, criminal investigations. These procedures, which go beyond what is legally required, will prevent any risk of creating an unwarranted appearance that FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) is being used to avoid procedural safeguards which would apply in a criminal investigation."

And therein is the framework for the legal conundrum faced by Able Danger, and why Atta and his minions were free to hijack 4 airliners on 9/11.





“Able Danger”: The American People Should Demand Answers

Questions of Legal Issues, Intelligence Oversight and Sharing of Collected Intelligence from US SOCOM that ARE NOT being asked

By Sean Osborne, Senior Analyst & Military Affairs Expert

11 August 2005: As we reported yesterday, Congressman Curt Weldon (R-PA) delivered to his peers in Congress on 27 June, 2005 revelations and evidence gained by a secret military intelligence entity, Code Name: “Able Danger” a full year prior to the events of September 11, 2001. (See article below). According to Congressman Weldon, and as reported by FoxNews yesterday, "Lawyers within the administration — and we're talking about the Clinton administration, not the Bush administration — said 'you can't do it'" when referencing the “taking out” of a known terrorist cell that would be the main component of the 9/11 attacks. These “lawyers” then placed 3M Post-It brand stickers over Mohammed Atta's face. In my professional opinion, the words and actions taken by these lawyers were the beginning of a literal, real-world cover-up which would result in the deaths of 2,819 innocent human beings. This situation begs for Congressional inquiry into exactly who these lawyers are- their names, where are they today and additionally, where is the evidence of any legal oversight of their actions - which appear to be demonstrably illegal, incompetent, negligent and possibly conducted with the highest degree of malfeasance.. Furthermore, additional questions for a Congressional inquiry are: (1) under whose specific direction did they act, and (2) under what legal authority did they act? In general, why did they NOT share information with our intelligence agencies to allow Atta and his fellow terrorists to be stopped when there was ample legal ability to do so?

There is a very salient and critical point virtually every reporting media outlet has been remiss in identifying regarding intelligence collection activities by the United States Department of Defense. It is this: ALL US Department of Defense intelligence activities, just like US SOCOM's "Able Danger," ARE NOT derived from, emanate from or promulgated by US law and Congressional legislation. They arise specifically from Executive Order 12333 (signed by President Ronald Reagan on December 4, 1981) and all the authority resides and has resided since that time with the President of the United States who is the military Commander-In-Chief as well as the chief constitutional law enforcement officer of the land.

Details of E.O. 12333 can be found here.

Specifically, as found section 1.11, line items (d), (f) and (k) Presidential Executive Order 12333 gives direction to the Secretary of Defense as follows:

(d) Conduct counterintelligence activities in support of Department of Defense components outside the United States in coordination with the CIA, and within the United States in coordination with the FBI pursuant to procedures agreed upon by the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General;

(f) Provide for the timely transmission of critical intelligence, as defined by the Director of Central Intelligence, within the United States Government;

(k) Conduct such administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States as are necessary to perform the functions described in sections (a) through (j) above.

Section 1.12, line item (d) states the following:

The foreign intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps,

Whose responsibilities shall include: (1) Collection, production and dissemination of military and military-related foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, and information on the foreign aspects of narcotics production and trafficking. When collection is conducted in response to national foreign intelligence requirements, it will be conducted in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence. Collection of national foreign intelligence, not otherwise obtainable, outside the United States shall be coordinated with the CIA, and such collection within the United States shall be coordinated with the FBI;

Additionally, EO 12333 concludes with the following:

Agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to:

(b) Unless otherwise precluded by law or this Order, participate in law enforcement activities to investigate or prevent clandestine intelligence activities by foreign powers, or international terrorist or narcotics activities;

Finally we come to the strawman legal argument which came from the “administration lawyers” as related by Congressman Weldon regarding the possession of “green cards”. The facts are these: Mohammed Atta and his terrorist cohorts were clearly and factually established as Al-Qaeda functionaries of a foreign government [Taliban of Afghanistan] with Al-Qaeda itself being a Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (DFTO). Designated terrorist’s do not receive and retain "green card" status, and any card so previously attained would have to be considered a priori fraudulent, null and void.

These are the salient facts regarding the intelligence collected by “Able Danger”. What remains is the also overlooked Congressional oversight of intelligence activities as delineated in EO 12333. The now defunct blue-ribbon 9/11 Commission having dropped the ball once is excused from further inquiry, and we call for a full-scale Congressional investigation which must reveal the truth of the matter to the American people. This is what we taxpayers pay them to do. It what our tax dollars paid “Able Danger” to do, and what EO-12333 signed by President Ronald Reagan in December 1981 directed them to do on our behalf.

[Sean Osborne]

Here's the deal on the most recent events...

Kean and Hamilton are talking specifically about the July 12, 2004 meeting between the military officer and members of the 9/11 Commission and not the October 2003 briefing while in Afghanistan.

Read THIS.

They conveniently (or by specific omission) do not mention the October 2003 meeting between Able Danger briefers and Philip Zelicow, the 9/11 Commission Staff Executive Director.

Zelikow appointed 9/11 Commission Special Counsel Dietrich L. Snell to be the Team Leader reposnsible for all specific information or intelligence on the 9/11 Al Qaeda Plot and the movements of the hijackers prior to 9/11/2001.

According to the 9/11 Commission Final Report, Section 7, this is what they knew specifically regarding Mohamed ATTA and his Al Qaeda terrorist cell.

quote:

---

"In the early summer of 2000, the Hamburg group arrived in the United States to begin flight training. Marwan al Shehhi came on May 29, arriving in Newark on a flight from Brussels. He went to New York City and waited there for Mohamed Atta to join him. On June 2, Atta traveled to the Czech Republic by bus from Germany and then flew from Prague to Newark the next day."

---

Here we have Mohamed Atta arriving in the U.S. at Newark International Airport, New Jersey, on June 3, 2000.

What does the final report say about the remainder of the Summer months of 2000 regarding the activities of Atta and Cell? CAPITALIZATION mine for emphasis.

AQ Movements and Activity in the Summer 2000

quote:

---

"After visiting the Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma, (Mohamed) Atta
started flight instruction at Huffman Aviation in Venice, Florida, and both Atta
and Shehhi subsequently enrolled in the Accelerated Pilot Program at that
school. BY THE END OF JULY, (2000) both of them took solo flights, and BY
MID-AUGUST (2000) they passed the private pilot airman test. THEY TRAINED
THROUGH THE SUMMER AT HUFFMAN, while Jarrah continued his training at FFTC."

---

Clearly there is NOTHING here to preclude or preempt Able Danger intelligence on Mohammed Atta during the summer of 2000, nor any valid rationale for the information they provided to Philip Zelikow/Snell's team in October 2003 or on July 12, 2004 to have been summarily dismissed as inconsistent with Commission information or conclusions.

Here's the latest from ...

By DOUGLAS JEHL – NY Times - August 13, 2005

WASHINGTON, Aug. 12 - The Sept. 11 commission concluded that an intelligence program known as Able Danger "did not turn out to be historically significant," despite hearing a claim that the program had identified the future plot leader Mohammed Atta as a potential terrorist threat more than a year before the 2001 attacks, the commission's former leaders said in a statement on Friday evening.

The statement said a review of testimony and documents had found that the single claim in July 2004 by a Navy officer was the only time the name of Mr. Atta or any other future hijacker was mentioned to the commission as having been known before the hijackings. That account is consistent with statements this week by a commission spokesman, but it contradicts claims by a former defense intelligence official who said he had told the commission staff about Able Danger's work on Mr. Atta during a briefing in Afghanistan in October 2003.

[Ryan Ruck]

Terror Alert Weeks Before Cole Attack

Members of a secret Pentagon intelligence unit known as Able Danger warned top military generals that it had uncovered information of increased al Qaeda "activity" in Aden harbor less than three weeks before the attack on the USS Cole, The Post has learned.

In the latest explosive revelation in the Able Danger saga, two former members of the data-mining team are expected to testify to the Senate Judiciary Committee next week that they uncovered alarming terrorist activity and associations in Aden weeks before the Oct. 12, 2000, suicide bombing of the U.S. warship that killed 17 sailors.

Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, the Defense Intelligence Agency's former liaison to Able Danger, told The Post that Capt. Scott Phillpott, Able Danger's leader, briefed Gen. Peter Schoomaker, former head of Special Operations Command and now Army chief of staff, about the findings on Yemen "two or three weeks" before the Cole attack.

"Yemen was elevated by Able Danger to be one of the top three hot spots for al Qaeda in the entire world," Shaffer recalled.

Shaffer and two other officials familiar with Able Danger said contractors uncovered al Qaeda activities in Yemen through a search of Osama bin Laden's business ties.

The Pentagon had no immediate comment.

[Sean Osborne]

The following is related to Able Danger... it's well worth a going over closely to understand the methodology and mindset of the American 5th column enemy - those leftist politicians, media, assorted legal professionals and socialist one-world American's who seek the failure and defeat of the United States to further their own agenda. That it comes from the leftist New York Times should be a surprise to no one. This is part and parcel of the disinformation and influence capaign, a real world psychological operation being waged by the American 5th column against the American public.

December 15, 2005
Bush Secretly Lifted Some Limits on Spying in U.S. After 9/11, Officials Say
By JAMES RISEN
and ERIC LICHTBLAU
WASHINGTON, Dec. 15 - Months after the Sept. 11 attacks, President Bush secretly authorized the National Security Agency to eavesdrop on Americans and others inside the United States to search for evidence of terrorist activity without the court-approved warrants ordinarily required for domestic spying, according to government officials. [The precise terms should be 'US person'defined below; any 'others' non-citizen or non-resident aliens inside the US are not protected from intelligence surveillance and collection.]
Under a presidential order signed in 2002, the intelligence agency has monitored the international telephone calls and international e-mail messages of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people inside the United States without warrants over the past three years in an effort to track possible "dirty numbers" linked to Al Qaeda, the officials said. The agency, they said, still seeks warrants to monitor entirely domestic communications.
The previously undisclosed decision to permit some eavesdropping inside the country without court approval represents a major shift in American intelligence-gathering practices, particularly for the National Security Agency, whose mission is to spy on communications abroad. As a result, some officials familiar with the continuing operation have questioned whether the surveillance has stretched, if not crossed, constitutional limits on legal searches.
"This is really a sea change," said a former senior official who specializes in national security law. "It's almost a mainstay of this country that the N.S.A. only does foreign searches." [Not true, a lie, given the status and background of this individual-domestic intelligence collection under established intelligence oversight, procedures and rules is a mainstay of American national security.]
Nearly a dozen current and former officials, who were granted anonymity because of the classified nature of the program, discussed it with reporters for The New York Times because of their concerns about the operation's legality and oversight [...or their political biases and partisanship. This is a leak of a classified program to the NYT and violation of law; the DoJ should aggressively pursue. ]
According to those officials and others, reservations about aspects of the program have also been expressed by Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, the West Virginia Democrat who is the vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and a judge presiding over a secret court that oversees intelligence matters. Some of the questions about the agency's new powers led the administration to temporarily suspend the operation last year and impose more restrictions, the officials said.
The Bush administration views the operation as necessary so that the agency can move quickly to monitor communications that may disclose threats to this country, the officials said. Defenders of the program say it has been a critical tool in helping disrupt terrorist plots and prevent attacks inside the United States.
Administration officials are confident that existing safeguards are sufficient to protect the privacy and civil liberties of Americans, the officials say. In some cases, they said, the Justice Department eventually seeks warrants if it wants to expand the eavesdropping to include communications confined within the United States. The officials said the administration had briefed Congressional leaders about the program and notified the judge in charge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, the secret Washington court that deals with national security issues. [ This belies the NYT own charge and assertion this is a secret and criminal activity. Notifications were made to Congress and the FISA court.]
The White House asked The New York Times not to publish this article, arguing that it could jeopardize continuing investigations and alert would-be terrorists that they might be under scrutiny. After meeting with senior administration officials to hear their concerns, the newspaper delayed publication for a year to conduct additional reporting. Some information that administration officials argued could be useful to terrorists has been omitted. [Or is this timed to coincide with the publication of the book by the same author of this article-Mr. Risen?]
While many details about the program remain secret, officials familiar with it said the N.S.A. eavesdropped without warrants on up to 500 people in the United States at any given time. The list changes as some names are added and others dropped, so the number monitored in this country may have reached into the thousands over the past three years, several officials said. Overseas, about 5,000 to 7,000 people suspected of terrorist ties are monitored at one time, according to those officials.
Several officials said the eavesdropping program had helped uncover a plot by Iyman Faris, an Ohio trucker and naturalized citizen who pleaded guilty in 2003 to supporting Al Qaeda by planning to bring down the Brooklyn Bridge with blowtorches. What appeared to be another Qaeda plot, involving fertilizer bomb attacks on British pubs and train stations, was exposed last year in part through the program, the officials said. But they said most people targeted for N.S.A. monitoring have never been charged with a crime, including an Iranian-American doctor in the South who came under suspicion because of what one official described as dubious ties to Osama bin Laden. [Criminal activity is not a required basis for the collection of intelligence on US persons.]
Dealing With a New Threat
The eavesdropping program grew out of concerns after the Sept. 11 attacks that the nation's intelligence agencies were not poised to deal effectively with the new threat of Al Qaeda and that they were handcuffed by legal and bureaucratic restrictions better suited to peacetime than war, according to officials. In response, President Bush significantly eased limits on American intelligence and law enforcement agencies and the military.
But some of the administration's antiterrorism initiatives have provoked an outcry from members of Congress, watchdog groups, immigrants and others who argue that the measures erode protections for civil liberties and intrude on Americans' privacy. Opponents have challenged provisions of the USA Patriot Act, the focus of contentious debate on Capitol Hill this week, that expand domestic surveillance by giving the Federal Bureau of Investigation more power to collect information like library lending lists or Internet use. Military and F.B.I. officials have drawn criticism for monitoring what were largely peaceful antiwar protests. The Pentagon and the Department of Homeland Security were forced to retreat on plans to use public and private databases to hunt for possible terrorists. And last year, the Supreme Court rejected the administration's claim that those labeled "enemy combatants" were not entitled to judicial review of their open-ended detention.
Mr. Bush's executive order allowing some warrantless eavesdropping on those inside the United States including American citizens, permanent legal residents, tourists and other foreigners is based on classified legal opinions that assert that the president has broad powers to order such searches, derived in part from the September 2001 Congressional resolution authorizing him to wage war on Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, according to the officials familiar with the N.S.A. operation.
The National Security Agency, which is based at Fort Meade, Md., is the nation's largest and most secretive intelligence agency, so intent on remaining out of public view that it has long been nicknamed "No Such Agency.'' It breaks codes and maintains listening posts around the world to eavesdrop on foreign governments, diplomats and trade negotiators as well as drug lords and terrorists. But the agency ordinarily operates under tight restrictions on any spying on Americans, even if they are overseas, or disseminating information about them.
What the agency calls a "special collection program" began soon after the Sept. 11 attacks, as it looked for new tools to attack terrorism. The program accelerated in early 2002 after the Central Intelligence Agency started capturing top Qaeda operatives overseas, including Abu Zubaydah, who was arrested in Pakistan in March 2002. The C.I.A. seized the terrorists' computers, cellphones and personal phone directories, said the officials familiar with the program. The N.S.A. surveillance was intended to exploit those numbers and addresses as quickly as possible, the officials said.
In addition to eavesdropping on those numbers and reading e-mail messages to and from the Qaeda figures, the N.S.A. began monitoring others linked to them, creating an expanding chain. While most of the numbers and addresses were overseas, hundreds were in the United States, the officials said.
Under the agency's longstanding rules, the N.S.A. can target for interception phone calls or e-mail messages on foreign soil, even if the recipients of those communications are in the United States. Usually, though, the government can only target phones and e-mail messages in this country by first obtaining a court order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which holds its closed sessions at the Justice Department.
Traditionally, the F.B.I., not the N.S.A., seeks such warrants and conducts most domestic eavesdropping. Until the new program began, the N.S.A. typically limited its domestic surveillance to foreign embassies and missions in Washington, New York and other cities, and obtained court orders to do so.
Since 2002, the agency has been conducting some warrantless eavesdropping on people in the United States who are linked, even if indirectly, to suspected terrorists through the chain of phone numbers and e-mail addresses, according to several officials who know of the operation. Under the special program, the agency monitors their international communications, the officials said. The agency, for example, can target phone calls from someone in New York to someone in Afghanistan.
Warrants are still required for eavesdropping on entirely domestic-to-domestic communications, those officials say, meaning that calls from that New Yorker to someone in California could not be monitored without first going to the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Court.
A White House Briefing
After the special program started, Congressional leaders from both political parties were brought to Vice President Dick Cheney's office in the White House. The leaders, who included the chairmen and ranking members of the Senate and House intelligence committees, learned of the N.S.A. operation from Mr. Cheney, Gen. Michael V. Hayden of the Air Force, who was then the agency's director and is now the principal deputy director of national intelligence, and George J. Tenet, then the director of the C.I.A., officials said. [Clearly Congressional leaders were notified so it is not a secret of the Bush administration, but a secret intelligence activity of the United States Government.]
It is not clear how much the members of Congress were told about the presidential order and the eavesdropping program. Some of them declined to comment about the matter, while others did not return phone calls.
Later briefings were held for members of Congress as they assumed leadership roles on the intelligence committees, officials familiar with the program said. After a 2003 briefing, Senator Rockefeller, the West Virginia Democrat who became vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee that year, wrote a letter to Mr. Cheney expressing concerns about the program, officials knowledgeable about the letter said. It could not be determined if he received a reply. Mr. Rockefeller declined to comment. Aside from the Congressional leaders, only a small group of people, including several cabinet members and officials at the N.S.A., the C.I.A. and the Justice Department, know of the program.
Some officials familiar with it say they consider warrantless eavesdropping inside the United States to be unlawful and possibly unconstitutional, amounting to an improper search. One government official involved in the operation said he privately complained to a Congressional official about his doubts about the legality of the program. But nothing came of his inquiry. "People just looked the other way because they didn't want to know what was going on," he said.
A senior government official recalled that he was taken aback when he first learned of the operation. "My first reaction was, 'We're doing what?' " he said. While he said he eventually felt that adequate safeguards were put in place, he added that questions about the program's legitimacy were understandable. [Many people including high government officials are ignorant of the rules, procedures and laws governing domestic intelligence operations.]
Some of those who object to the operation argue that is unnecessary. By getting warrants through the foreign intelligence court, the N.S.A. and F.B.I. could eavesdrop on people inside the United States who might be tied to terrorist groups without skirting longstanding rules, they say.
The standard of proof required to obtain a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is generally considered lower than that required for a criminal warrant intelligence officials only have to show probable cause that someone may be "an agent of a foreign power," which includes international terrorist groups and the secret court has turned down only a small number of requests over the years. In 2004, according to the Justice Department, 1,754 warrants were approved. And the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court can grant emergency approval for wiretaps within hours, officials say.
Administration officials counter that they sometimes need to move more urgently, the officials said. Those involved in the program also said that the N.S.A.'s eavesdroppers might need to start monitoring large batches of numbers all at once, and that it would be impractical to seek permission from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court first, according to the officials. [Absolutely, we live in a new technological age we can adapt or our enemies will adapt and continue to kill Americans and attack our interests.]
Culture of Caution and Rules
The N.S.A. domestic spying operation has stirred such controversy among some national security officials in part because of the agency's cautious culture and longstanding rules.
Widespread abuses including eavesdropping on Vietnam War protesters and civil rights activists by American intelligence agencies became public in the 1970's and led to passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which imposed strict limits on intelligence gathering on American soil. Among other things, the law required search warrants, approved by the secret F.I.S.A. court, for wiretaps in national security cases. The agency, deeply scarred by the scandals, adopted additional rules that all but ended domestic spying on its part.
After the Sept. 11 attacks, though, the United States intelligence community was criticized for being too risk-averse. The National Security Agency was even cited by the independent 9/11 Commission for adhering to self-imposed rules that were stricter than those set by federal law.
Several senior government officials say that when the special operation first began, there were few controls on it and little formal oversight outside the N.S.A. The agency can choose its eavesdropping targets and does not have to seek approval from Justice Department or other Bush administration officials. Some agency officials wanted nothing to do with the program, apparently fearful of participating in an illegal operation, a former senior Bush administration official said. Before the 2004 election, the official said, some N.S.A. personnel worried that the program might come under scrutiny by Congressional or criminal investigators if Senator John Kerry, the Democratic nominee, was elected president.
In mid-2004, concerns about the program expressed by national security officials, government lawyers and a judge prompted the Bush administration to suspend elements of the program and revamp it.
For the first time, the Justice Department audited the N.S.A. program, several officials said. And to provide more guidance, the Justice Department and the agency expanded and refined a checklist to follow in deciding whether probable cause existed to start monitoring someone's communications, several officials said.
A complaint from Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, the federal judge who oversees the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Court, helped spur the suspension, officials said. The judge questioned whether information obtained under the N.S.A. program was being improperly used as the basis for F.I.S.A. wiretap warrant requests from the Justice Department, according to senior government officials. While not knowing all the details of the exchange, several government lawyers said there appeared to be concerns that the Justice Department, by trying to shield the existence of the N.S.A. program, was in danger of misleading the court about the origins of the information cited to justify the warrants.
One official familiar with the episode said the judge insisted to Justice Department lawyers at one point that any material gathered under the special N.S.A. program not be used in seeking wiretap warrants from her court. Judge Kollar-Kotelly did not return calls for comment.
A related issue arose in a case in which the F.B.I. was monitoring the communications of a terrorist suspect under a F.I.S.A.-approved warrant, even though the National Security Agency was already conducting warrantless eavesdropping. According to officials, F.B.I. surveillance of Mr. Faris, the Brooklyn Bridge plotter, was dropped for a short time because of technical problems. At the time, senior Justice Department officials worried what would happen if the N.S.A. picked up information that needed to be presented in court. The government would then either have to disclose the N.S.A. program or mislead a criminal court about how it had gotten the information.
The Civil Liberties Question
Several national security officials say the powers granted the N.S.A. by President Bush go far beyond the expanded counterterrorism powers granted by Congress under the USA Patriot Act, which is up for renewal. The House on Wednesday approved a plan to reauthorize crucial parts of the law. But final passage has been delayed under the threat of a Senate filibuster because of concerns from both parties over possible intrusions on Americans' civil liberties and privacy.
Under the act, law enforcement and intelligence officials are still required to seek a F.I.S.A. warrant every time they want to eavesdrop within the United States. A recent agreement reached by Republican leaders and the Bush administration would modify the standard for F.B.I. wiretap warrants, requiring, for instance, a description of a specific target. Critics say the bar would remain too low to prevent abuses.
Bush administration officials argue that the civil liberties concerns are unfounded, and they say pointedly that the Patriot Act has not freed the N.S.A. to target Americans. "Nothing could be further from the truth," wrote John Yoo, a former official in the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, and his co-author in a Wall Street Journal opinion article in December 2003. Mr. Yoo worked on a classified legal opinion on the N.S.A.'s domestic eavesdropping program.
At an April hearing on the Patriot Act renewal, Senator Barbara A. Mikulski, Democrat of Maryland, asked Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales and Robert S. Mueller III, the director of the F.B.I., "Can the National Security Agency, the great electronic snooper, spy on the American people?"
"Generally," Mr. Mueller said, "I would say generally, they are not allowed to spy or to gather information on American citizens." [Of course, generally no intelligence agency or program can will-nilly gather information on US citizens outside of established rules, procedures and laws...so this point is bogus, dubious and designed to leave a misimpression. ] President Bush did not ask Congress to include provisions for the N.S.A. domestic surveillance program as part of the Patriot Act and has not sought any other laws to authorize the operation. Bush administration lawyers argued that such new laws were unnecessary, because they believed that the Congressional resolution on the campaign against terrorism provided ample authorization, officials said.
Seeking Congressional approval was also viewed as politically risky because the proposal would be certain to face intense opposition on civil liberties grounds. The administration also feared that by publicly disclosing the existence of the operation, its usefulness in tracking terrorists would end, officials said.
The legal opinions that support the N.S.A. operation remain classified, but they appear to have followed private discussions among senior administration lawyers and other officials about the need to pursue aggressive strategies that once may have been seen as crossing a legal line, according to senior officials who participated in the discussions.
For example, just days after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on New York and the Pentagon, Mr. Yoo, the Justice Department lawyer, wrote an internal memorandum that argued that the government might use "electronic surveillance techniques and equipment that are more powerful and sophisticated than those available to law enforcement agencies in order to intercept telephonic communications and observe the movement of persons but without obtaining warrants for such uses."
Mr. Yoo noted that while such actions could raise constitutional issues, in the face of devastating terrorist attacks "the government may be justified in taking measures which in less troubled conditions could be seen as infringements of individual liberties."
The next year, Justice Department lawyers disclosed their thinking on the issue of warrantless wiretaps in national security cases in a little-noticed brief in an unrelated court case. In that 2002 brief, the government said that "the Constitution vests in the President inherent authority to conduct warrantless intelligence surveillance (electronic or otherwise) of foreign powers or their agents, and Congress cannot by statute extinguish that constitutional authority."
Administration officials were also encouraged by a November 2002 appeals court decision in an unrelated matter. The decision by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, which sided with the administration in dismantling a bureaucratic "wall" limiting cooperation between prosecutors and intelligence officers, noted "the president's inherent constitutional authority to conduct warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance."
But the same court suggested that national security interests should not be grounds "to jettison the Fourth Amendment requirements" protecting the rights of Americans against undue searches. The dividing line, the court acknowledged, "is a very difficult one to administer."[This is the critical line in this article that dismantles this whole distorted, damnable, dishonest, discussion in this NYT propaganda piece... that the FISA appeals court itself has upheld the President's authority "to conduct warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance." This is an extremely important point and likely provides the basis for every new intelligence collection initiative this Administration is trying to do to protect this Country.]

[Sean Osborne]

The controversy revolves around the President's authorities and use of NSA to collect time-sensitive intelligence by SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) means. The New York Times and its author James Risen who obtained this information from a source or sources in violation of criminal law and in detriment to the national security and safety of my family [not sure how personally you might take this] makes several implications and accusations I will address in detail.

1. FISA warrants can be obtained to conduct intelligence collection and surveillance on US persons within the US...we spy on Americans in America if 'warranted'.

2. NSA collects intelligence on foreign persons routinely...if you call your friend Habib Jalalabad in Afghanistan, Habib's conversation could be monitored; collaterally yours is too, but you are not the target.

3. The Clinton Administration campaigned for authority to use 'roving wiretaps.' In the information age we live today, if you had to seek a warrant every time against each target for each different communications device used, then expect to see a mushroom cloud where you don't want to someday. It makes better sense to target the numbers and IP addresses that have established ties to a foreign government, entity, drug trafficking or terrorist organization or are not covered by US intelligence oversight provisions. In 2001 after 9/11 the authority for 'roving wiretaps' was ultimately approved in the Patriot Act.

4. The NYT articles undercuts its entire 'in secret' actions by an unscrupulous President Bush by clearly stating that this program had been advised to Congress, and the FISA Court, and has a periodic review process, and was legally reviewed by the White House and DoJ lawyers.

5. Finally, the NYT article explodes its entire implied thesis that this was all being done in violation of law, the Constitution, and FISA procedures because the Administration obtained authority to conduct these surveillances from the FISA Appeals Court of Review itself...so the FISA process has approved the USG to conduct certain types of surveillances without 'warrants.' The appeals court determination was made based on what the President said...the Constitution and the President's powers as Commander in Chief and the authority given to the President by Congress when it voted and approved the Global War on Terror.

This is also not a fully 'new' story as evidenced by Clinton Administration actions with the Echelon Program. This is simply another exercise in 'fear mongering' an unwitting American public for political effects.

See also Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court -- 2005 Membership

[Malsua]

There are Able Danger hearings occuring today in DC. Not so suprisingly, even C-Span won't be airing it.

That said, here's a good one.

-------
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/viewstor...20060215d.html



'Able Danger' Identified 9/11 Hijacker 13 times
By Sherrie Gossett
CNSNews.com Staff Writer
February 15, 2006

Washington (CNSNews.com) - The top-secret, military intelligence unit known as "Able Danger" identified Mohammed Atta, the leader of the Sept. 11 hijackers, 13 times before the 2001 attacks, according to new information released Tuesday by U.S. Rep. Curt Weldon, (R-Pa.), chairman of the House Armed Services and Homeland Security Committees.

Able Danger has been identified by Weldon and team member Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer as an elite group of approximately two dozen individuals tasked with identifying and targeting the links and relationships of al Qaeda worldwide.

On June 27, 2005, Weldon said that Able Danger had offered in the year before the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to share its intelligence with the FBI and to work with them to take down the New York City terrorist cell involving Mohammed Atta and two other 9/11 terrorists. Weldon said Clinton administration lawyers prevented the information from being shared with the FBI.

According to Weldon, the lawyers told Able Danger members, " [Y]ou cannot pursue contact with the FBI against that cell. Mohamed Atta is in the U.S. on a green card and we are fearful of the fallout from the Waco incident," a reference to the FBI's raid on the David Koresh-led Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Tex., in April 1993.

Media reports indicated that lawyers for Able Danger were concerned that sharing data with domestic law enforcement was illegal.

Weldon on Tuesday said that despite testimony indicating that Able Danger's data had been destroyed, he has discovered data still available. "And I am in contact with people who are still able to [do] data mining runs on pre-9/11 data," Weldon said. "In those data runs that are now being done today, in spite of what DOD (Department of Defense) said I have 13 hits on Mohammed Atta ..."

Weldon would not name the individual helping him obtain the Able Danger data.

As recently as two weeks ago additional Able Danger material was found in files at the Pentagon, Weldon said. "[A] general was present as the information was taken out of file cabinets ..."

The program and its pre-9/11 intelligence will be the subject of hearings Wednesday conducted by the Armed Services Committee. Most of the hearings will be open, but parts will be closed, Weldon said, due to witness fears of retaliation.

The witness list includes Dr. Steve Cambone, Eric Kleinsmith, J.D. Smith, Lt. Col. Shaffer, Commander Scott Philpot and Dr. Eileen Pricer.

Weldon also said his staff is still identifying additional witnesses. "At least one additional witness has come forward who just retired from one of the intelligence agencies, who will also testify under oath that he was well-aware of and identified Mohammed Atta's both name and photo prior to 9/11 occurring." Weldon said.

"Today and tomorrow, Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer will testify in his uniform under oath in spite of an aggressive effort by [Defense Intelligence Agency] bureaucrats to tarnish his image," Weldon said.

The congressman has detailed a "smear campaign," allegedly conducted by DIA officials against Shaffer.

The information provided by Shaffer contradicts the official conclusion of the 9/11 Commission, that U.S. intelligence had not identified Atta as a terrorist before the attacks on New York City and the Pentagon.

Weldon also said that despite the fact that Dr. Philip Zelikow, executive director of the 9/11 Commission has denied meeting with Shaffer, "irrefutable evidence" of a meeting will be presented at Wednesday's congressional hearing.

During a hearing Tuesday afternoon before the Subcommittee on National Security, Shaffer testified under oath that he met with Zelikow at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan. According to Shaffer, Zelikow said: "What you said today is very important. We need to continue this dialog when you return to the U.S." Zelikow gave him his business card at the time, Shaffer said. It is not known whether the business card is the "physical evidence of that meeting" Weldon said would be presented at Wednesday's hearing.

Weldon also said that within days of the Able Danger story breaking in the New York Times, his office received a call from 9/11 Commission member Jamie Gorelick, assistant attorney general during the Clinton administration. In an interview after the press conference, Weldon told Cybercast News Service that Gorelick told a Weldon aide that the message was "extremely urgent." Weldon was in Pennsylvania at the time and Gorelick was on vacation in Cape Cod.

Gorelick reportedly told Weldon's staff to pass on to Weldon the following message: "I did nothing wrong." Weldon also said Gorelick later called the Senate Judiciary Committee staff twice with the same message.

During his press conference Weldon also said the Able Danger group warned officials from the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) that terrorists were likely to target an American platform in Yemen at the Port of Aden. This message was relayed two days before the USS Cole Navy destroyer was attacked by al Qaeda on Oct. 12, 2000. Seventeen sailors died and 40 were injured in the attack.

Navy Captain Scott Philpott, also affiliated with Able Danger, reportedly briefed the head of Special Operations Command (SOCOM), Gen. Peter Schoomaker on the threat. Schoomaker is currently the chief of staff for the U.S. Army.

The USS Cole, which was headed to the Port of Aden to refuel, was never warned to stay away from the port, according to Weldon, who added that Able Danger had also warned CENTCOM two weeks prior to the USS Cole attack that there was massive terrorist activity in Yemen.

"I don't know what's going on. But I can tell you that this country needs to get to the bottom of who does not want the American people to know the facts leading up to 9/11; why the 9/11 Commission deliberately denied information to the commissioners ..." Weldon said.

He indicated that there were parties on both sides of the aisle who did not want the Able Danger issue to be pursued, and that he had been under unidentified pressure. Weldon would not elaborate.

"Was this an effort by both (Clinton and Bush) administrations to keep information from the American people about what was known before 9/11?" Weldon asked "If that's the case that is outrageous and wrong."

[vector7]

Woman Tied to 9/11, Fannie Mae on Obama's FBI Shortlist!

Fire it up 61
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AP
By Chris Neefus, CNSNews.com

The Obama administration reportedly is considering former Clinton administration official Jamie Gorelick, among others, to become the next director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

The Wall Street Journal’s Evan Perez first reported the news last week, citing “U.S. officials” familiar with the situation.

Gorelick served as vice chairman of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) when the government-sponsored enterprise began bundling subprime loans into securitized financial instruments. Prior to that, she served as deputy attorney general in the Clinton Justice Department under then-Attorney General Janet Reno from 1994 to 1997.
...

But Gorelick is perhaps best known for her 1995 memo, written when she was deputy attorney general, that later became known as “Gorelick’s Wall,” a policy prescription limiting the flow of information between intelligence gatherers and criminal investigators that some believe helped allow the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center to go unchallenged.