Air Force's Nuclear Focus Has Dimmed, Studies Find

[Ryan Ruck]

Air Force's Nuclear Focus Has Dimmed, Studies Find

The U.S. military has lost focus on its nuclear-weapons mission and has suffered a sharp decline in nuclear expertise, factors that may have contributed to a mishap last year in which a B-52 bomber unknowingly carried six nuclear warheads across the country, according to two new independent reviews.

Both studies found that levels of nuclear training and alertness at the Air Force slipped after the end of the Cold War. But one of the reports was much more critical, saying accidents far worse than the errant B-52 flight could occur without immediate changes in nuclear procedures.

"The task force and several of the senior [Defense Department] people interviewed believe that the decline in focus has been more pronounced than realized and too extreme to be acceptable," said the report compiled by an outside panel chaired by retired Air Force Gen. Larry D. Welch.

Both reviews were ordered after the August bomber flight, in which Air Force weapons officers accidentally loaded the B-52 in North Dakota with nuclear weapons.

The bombs were flown to an air base in Louisiana the following day, where they were eventually discovered and belatedly secured.

Dozens of officers have been either disciplined or relieved of command, but the Welch report's findings raise new questions about whether failures within the Air Force were more systemic than originally believed. The first Air Force investigation into the incident, completed in October, pinned much of the blame on individual officers at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota.

Neither Welch's study nor an internal Air Force review, conducted by Maj. Gen. Polly A. Peyer, found any failures in the security of U.S. nuclear weapons. But at a Capitol Hill hearing, Welch testified that the military units responsible for handling the bombs are not properly inspected and, as a result, may not be ready to perform their missions.

"We have uncovered no safety issues," Welch said. "If you look at all the areas and all the ways that we have to store and handle these weapons in order to perform the mission, it just requires, we believe, more resources and more attention than they're getting."

Both studies could put new pressure on Gen. T. Michael Moseley, the Air Force chief of staff, to reorganize the service's nuclear forces.

After the Cold War, the once-vaunted Strategic Air Command, which controlled all Air Force nuclear weapons, was dismantled. The military's nuclear missiles were assigned to a division responsible for operations in space, and its nuclear bombers were moved to Air Combat Command, which also includes nonnuclear fighters and reconnaissance aircraft.

Although the internal Air Force review has not been made public, a copy of its executive summary obtained by The Times asserts that the split organization has led to fragmentation of policies and accountability, without a single commander responsible for nuclear missions.

In an interview, Peyer, who headed the 30-person internal review, said that her report does not specifically recommend re-creating the Strategic Air Command, and she warned against attempting to go back to Cold War polices with a nuclear force that is now much smaller than in the 1980s.

"We can't go back to where we were in 1991," Peyer said. "We don't live in the same world. It's not the same environment."

(I 100% think that the SAC needs to be brought back. Though Maj. Gen. Peyer claims it isn't the "same environment" as during the Cold War, it most certainly is. It is because of the wishful thinking of military brass that they don't want it to be the "same environment" that we are in the situation outlined in this article. Though to give Maj. Gen. Peyer the benefit of the doubt, she is right in one sense of it not being the "same environment". We are now facing TWO major powers along with a worldwide cabal of Socialists/Communists/Leftists.)

However, the Welch report is highly critical of the split commands. The report concludes that combining nuclear forces with nonnuclear organizations has led to "markedly reduced levels of leadership whose daily focus is the nuclear enterprise and a general devaluation of the nuclear mission and those who perform the mission."

Welch's report was completed at the request of Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, who has already raised concerns with Air Force officials that the original investigation into the B-52 incident may have unfairly limited blame to midlevel officers. The internal Air Force investigation was ordered by Moseley.

Air Force officials said they are already implementing many of the recommendations in both reports but insisted that existing regulations governing nuclear procedures were adequate.

Testifying alongside Welch, Lt. Gen. Daniel J. Darnell, the Air Force's head of operations, said that while Peyer's blue-ribbon commission showed that the service could improve its nuclear programs, the underlying policies and procedures were validated.

"The Air Force portion of the nuclear deterrent is sound, and we will take every measure necessary to provide safe, secure, reliable nuclear surety to the American public," Darnell said.

[American Patriot]

I agree with your assessment Ryan. I was in the Air Force in the latter days of SAC, and they were... man, the people who made it to SAC were the best. We don't have those kinds of folks these days.

The "seriousness" of being in the military has to some degree, gone away. While the Marines certainly have it, and many Army folks I've met have it, the Air Force folks with whom I worked in my last days had the attitude of "I'm in the Air Force, I'm not a fighter".

I never understood that. The weekend after 9-11 I gave my rather famous "We're at war, and you're all soldiers first" speech, which by the way was not well received. Since then many of the men and women I worked with were deployed. I wasn't. I retired not long after and I hope they listened to me.

[Ryan Ruck]

Commander Says U.S. Must Update Its Nuclear Arsenal For The 21st Century

The U.S. needs a new, modern arsenal of nuclear weapons to use as a deterrent to attacks from other nations for the remainder of the 21st century, the top military commander for strategic warfare said Tuesday.

Air Force Gen. Kevin Chilton, head of the military's Strategic Command, said if the Pentagon develops an improved, more reliable nuclear weapon, the U.S. will be able to reduce the number of warheads it keeps on hand.

"So long as there are other countries in the world that possess enough nuclear weapons to destroy the United States of America and our way of life, we will have to deter those types of countries," Chilton told reporters at a breakfast meeting. "So I am not in favor of unilateral disarmament."

Comparing today's threat to the Cold War, when the U.S. was at loggerheads with the Soviets, Chilton said the principle deterrent was the "massive nuclear threat of destroying each other's countries."

Now, he said, the threat is different, thus the deterrent must also be more nuanced – ranging from nuclear warheads to conventional weapons and cyber-capabilities. And he said the existing warheads in the U.S. inventory today are "too big, bigger than they need to be."

Critics, however, worry that any such moves by the United States could trigger another international arms race, and a rush by other countries – such as Russia and China – to develop more effective, more usable nuclear weapons.

(To critics: There already is another international arms race. We just aren't in it!)

"This is something we should be very careful about – the signal we send to other nuclear powers in the world," said Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project for the Federation of American Scientists. "We don't want Russia and China to make more usable and tailored weapons capabilities."

Kristensen said members of Congress have already expressed concerns that developing weapons with lower yields would make them more usable.

"It's a good thing that we have weapons that are not very usable," he said. "The worst situation would be where they are more likely to be used."

Chilton noted that the United States has significantly reduced the number of nuclear weapons it now has in its active arsenal. By 2012, he said, the number would be reduced to about one-quarter of the total during the Cold War.

The 2002 Moscow treaty requires that the U.S. reduce its operationally deployed warheads to 1,700-2,220 by December 2012. In an exchange of data early last year, the Russians claimed to have 4,162 strategic warheads and the United States 5,866 in its arsenal.

Chilton said the military can use as a deterrent either a large stockpile or a more modern, responsive weapon in smaller numbers. And he advocated the latter, saying that would be a smarter way to reduce the nuclear inventory.

At the same time, he acknowledged that the warheads are powerful and terrible weapons.

"I'm a father too, with children, and I would love to have them grow up in a nuclear-free world," Chilton said. "But ... I also want them to grow up free. And as long as we have other nations out there with nuclear capabilities ... then we need to have a nuclear deterrent force that can do the mission of preserving our freedoms."

No kidding considering that Russia is deploying 11 new Topol-Ms and our last new missile (that hasn’t been decommissioned) was built when?

[Ryan Ruck]

5th Bomb Wing Flunks Nuclear Inspection

The 5th Bomb Wing at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., has failed its much-anticipated defense nuclear surety inspection, according to a Defense Threat Reduction Agency report.

DTRA inspectors gave the wing an "unsatisfactory" grade Sunday after uncovering many crucial mistakes during the weeklong inspection, which began May 17. They attributed the errors primarily to lack of supervision and leadership among security forces.

Inspectors from Air Combat Command also participated, but the Air Force refused to provide specifics on their findings.

Security broke down on multiple levels during simulated attacks across the base, including against nuclear weapons storage areas, according to the DTRA report, a copy of which was obtained by Air Force Times.

Inspectors watched as a security forces airman played video games on his cell phone while standing guard at a "restricted area perimeter," the DTRA report said. Meanwhile, another airman nearby was "unaware of her duties and responsibilities" during the exercise.

The lapses are baffling, given the high-level focus on Minot since last August, when 5th Bomb Wing airmen mistakenly loaded six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles onto a B-52 Stratofortress and flew them to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., where the plane sat on the flight line, unattended, for hours. That incident not only embarrassed the Air Force, but raised concerns worldwide about the deterioration in U.S. nuclear safety standards.

Col. Joel Westa took command of the 5th Bomb Wing following that fiasco. After it failed an initial nuclear surety inspection, or dry run, in December, Westa acknowledged this inspection was going to be the "most scrutinized inspection in the history of time."

Even so, airmen were unprepared.

"Overall their assessment painted a picture of some things we need to work on in the areas of training and discipline," Westa said in a statement.

His airmen are working diligently to correct deficiencies, he said.

Inspectors from Air Combat Command will now return to Minot in August to determine if the necessary improvements have been made. Eventually, the wing will have to pass a full defense nuclear surety inspection.

Although the wing failed, it will keep its certification to handle nuclear weapons and will carry on with training right up to the day ACC inspectors revisit the base, said Maj. Thomas Crosson, a command spokesman. The base lost its certification immediately after the incident last August and didn't have it restored until March 31, after it passed a second dry run.

The wing will participate in both a Red Flag exercise this summer and a nuclear readiness operation exercise as it prepares for the inspectors' next visit, Crosson said.

DTRA inspectors gave the wing passing grades in nine of 10 areas they examined, including safety and technical operations, but failed it for its nuclear security.

"The most serious failure is the one regarding security, which is exactly what the Minot incident was all about," said Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists.

Litany of failure

The DRTA report highlighted an incredible number of gaffes:

* An internal security response team didn't respond to its "pre-designated defensive fighting position" during an attack on the weapon storage area, leaving an entire side of the maintenance facility vulnerable to enemy fire.

* Security forces didn't clear a building upon entering it, which allowed inspectors to "kill" three of those four airmen.

* Security forces failed to use the correct entry codes, issued that week, to allow certain personnel into restricted areas.

* Security forces airmen failed to properly check an emergency vehicle for unauthorized personnel when it arrived at a weapons storage area, or search it correctly once it left.

* While wing airmen simulated loading an aircraft with nuclear weapons, security forces airmen failed to investigate vulnerabilities on the route from the storage area to the flight line, and didn't arm three SF airmen posted at traffic control points along that route.

* While on the aircraft, one flight of security forces airmen didn't understand key nuclear surety terminology, including the "two-person concept" — the security mechanism that requires two people to arm a nuclear weapon in case the codes fall into the hands of an airman gone bad.

"Security forces' level of knowledge, understanding of assigned duties, and response to unusual situations reflected a lack of adequate supervision," wrote the DTRA team chief.

Security forces leaders rarely visited their airmen on post, and routine exercises "were neither robust nor taken to their logical conclusion," according to the report.

After reviewing base records, inspectors found "leaders were unengaged [in] the proper supervision of SF airmen."

"If the leadership is still unengaged after all that has happened with the warheads, the missing ballistic missile fuses and problems with the first inspection, then they're not fit to have this mission," Kristensen said. "It's really frightening."

Security forces errors made up the majority of the 14-page DTRA inspection report, but inspectors found fault with other parts of operations, including late status reports and major errors in the wing's personnel reliability program, which dictates who can handle nukes.

While reviewing records, inspectors found one individual cleared to handle nukes had been "diagnosed for alcohol abuse" but was allowed to keep his certification, according to the report.

More Fallout?

Immediately after the loss of control over the six nuclear warheads last August, the former 5th Bomb Wing commander was fired, along with three other high-ranking officers. Sixty-nine airmen temporarily lost their certification to handle nukes.

Crosson said there are no plans to fire any "key personnel" now. He did not rule out punitive actions for other airmen, however.

This latest setback comes shortly after Air Force officials announced plans to form a new B-52 squadron at Minot, which will allow one bomber squadron to focus solely on the nuclear mission. The move is largely in response to the findings of a blue ribbon panel, which told Congress the bomber force had lost sight of the nuclear mission due to the heavy demands of supporting troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.

"Several of the senior [Defense Department] people interviewed believe that the decline in focus has been more pronounced than realized and too extreme to be acceptable," according to a report written by a Defense Science Board task force headed by retired Air Force Gen. Larry Welch, a former chief of staff.

Considering the level of resources dedicated to ensuring the 5th Bomb Wing could meet standards — including the arrival of new senior noncommissioned officers from other bases — Kristensen said he worries about nuclear security not only at Minot but across the service.

"It makes you wonder what's going on elsewhere, like the nuclear weapons stationed at bases overseas, and at Barksdale Air Force Base and Whiteman Air Force Base," he said.

ACC officials said the command will continue to support the 5th Bomb Wing's leadership and provide the manning to fix security problems.

"We take our responsibilities to protect and safeguard weapons with the utmost seriousness, and understand there is zero tolerance for errors," according to an ACC statement.

Airmen with the 5th Bomb Wing can expect more long hours ahead as the wing scrambles to fix its security holes before ACC inspectors return.

"They really need to drill their people to make sure this can't happen," Kristensen said.

It's not the first time airmen at Minot have heard such warnings.

[Ryan Ruck]

Changes Coming On Nuke Training, Inspection

Air Force leaders announced changes to the organization, training practices and inspection process of its nuclear enterprise following the service's Nuclear Summit held on Sept. 18 at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D.C.

Officials reviewed the recommendations made by the Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management on Sept. 12 in a report that ripped the Air Force's current nuclear structure proposing the service realign all of its nuclear missions under Air Force Space Command and rename it Air Force Strategic Command.

Air Force Secretary Michael Donley promised the service would discuss such a reorganization, but Ed Gulick, a service spokesman wrote in an e-mail Saturday morning that no final decisions on that would be made until early October, when the Air Force's top generals will meet.

However, Air Force leaders did approve four major changes to its nuclear enterprise during the summit related to recommendations made by the task force headed by former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger:

* An expanded Nuclear Weapons Center will oversee all nuclear sustainment including Weapons Storage Areas inside the U.S. that store nuclear weapons. However, the Air Force press release did not mention if the center would also oversee U.S. nuclear weapons stationed at airbases inside Europe like the Schlesinger's task force recommended.

* The Air Force will reshape its inspection process to be more centralized eliminating the prior practice of sending multiple inspection teams to nuclear bases with different sets of standards. Inspections will be "built upon common policies and procedures effectively integrated with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency," according to the service's release. The Air Force Inspector General decided last June to cut amount of warning nuclear units receive before inspections from six months to 72 hours. The Schlesinger task force recommended cutting that down to one hour. No announcement was made regarding any further changes.

* Security personnel assigned to nuclear units will see an expansion to the lead-in and follow-on mission specific training they complete. This decision comes after inspectors found several deficiencies in the nuclear security provided at the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., during a Nuclear Surety Inspection the base failed last year.

Air Force Headquarters will now have a new staff office that will "provide singular nuclear focus on nuclear matters." It's unclear what general will be tapped to lead the new Headquarters Air Force/A10 staff office in the Pentagon. This comes after Gates said on Sept. 12 he still had concerns regarding the Air Force's "unity of command" regarding nuclear matters.

The announcement of the changes comes just days before its expected that several Air Force generals and colonels will be disciplined for mistakes made handling nuclear weapons and nuclear-related materials over the past year, said congressional and Air Force sources.

[vector7]

Air Force nuclear unit fails inspection

• Story Highlights
• Unit at Wyoming base fails to document missile handling, Air Force officials say
• The 90th Missile Wing has 90 days to make corrections
• No risk to Minuteman III nuclear missiles, officials say
  
• Next Article in U.S. »

By Barbara Starr
CNN Pentagon Correspondent

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- For the fifth time this year, a U.S. Air Force nuclear weapons unit failed an inspection, this time because of failure to document its handling of nuclear missiles and other critical issues, Air Force officials said.



In an Air Force file photo, an airman inspects a missile part at a training site.

A "nuclear surety inspection" and "unit compliance inspection" was conducted this month on the 90th Missile Wing at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming by an Air Force inspector general.

There was no risk to the unit's Minuteman III nuclear missiles, Air Force officials said.

The unit has 90 days to correct the problems and pass another inspection.

In the wake of recent problems, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and top Air Force officials have indicated a zero tolerance for failing inspections, but no punishments are expected in this case, officials said.

The inspection report found the maintenance unit failed to document tests conducted on missiles correctly, including tests on safety devices. The inspector general told the unit the failures indicated either a "lack of competence" or "disregard for procedures," according to a source who has seen the report.

Additionally, failures included having some personnel on duty without proper medical clearance and failure to inspect radiation detectors.

Other units that failed inspections this year included two bomb wings and two missile units.

http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/12/18/air...rss_topstories

[Ryan Ruck]

Nuclear-Warhead Upgrade Delayed; Government Labs Forgot How to Make Parts

The Department of Defense and the National Nuclear Security Administration had to wait more than a year to refurbish aging nuclear warheads — partly because they had forgotten how to make a crucial component, a government report states.

Regarding a classified material codenamed "Fogbank," a Government Accountability Office report released this month states that "NNSA had lost knowledge of how to manufacture the material because it had kept few records of the process when the material was made in the 1980s and almost all staff with expertise on production had retired or left the agency."

So the effort to refurbish and upgrade W76 warheads, which top the U.S. Navy's (and the British Royal Navy's) submarine-launched Trident missiles, had to be put on hold while experts scoured old records and finally figured out how to manufacture the stuff once again.

According to the Sunday Herald of Glasgow, Scotland, Fogbank is "thought by some weapons experts to be a foam used between the fission and fusion stages of a thermonuclear [hydrogen] bomb."

The National Nuclear Security Administration is a semi-autonomous agency within the Department of Energy. It is responsible for the manufacture and upkeep of the nation's nuclear weapons.

A new facility was built at the Y-12 National Security Complex near Oak Ridge, Tenn., to begin production of Fogbank once again, but was delayed by poor planning, cost overruns and an failed effort to find an alternative to Fogbank.

"The Navy originally planned to start replacing old W76 warheads with refurbished ones on submarines in April 2008," states the GAO report. "However, owing to W76 production delays, the Navy had to replace aging parts of W76 warheads in its current arsenal and has had to delay replacing old warheads with newly refurbished weapons until April 2009."

The first refurbished W76 warhead was delivered to the U.S. Navy last month, according to an NNSA press release.

[Ryan Ruck]

How The US Forgot How To Make Trident Missiles

Inquiry cites loss of files and key staff as reason for $69m repair delay

Plans to refurbish Trident nuclear weapons had to be put on hold because US scientists forgot how to manufacture a component of the warhead, a US congressional investigation has revealed.

The US National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) "lost knowledge" of how to make a mysterious but very hazardous material codenamed Fogbank. As a result, the warhead refurbishment programme was put back by at least a year, and racked up an extra $69 million.

According to some critics, the delay could cause major problems for the UK Trident programme, which is very closely tied to the US programme and uses much of the same technology. The US and the UK are trying to refurbish the ageing W76 warheads that tip Trident missiles in order to prolong their life, and ensure they are safe and reliable. This apparently requires that the Fogbank in the warheads is replaced.

Neither the NNSA nor the UK Ministry of Defence would say anything about the nature or function of Fogbank. But it is thought by some weapons experts to be a foam used between the fission and fusion stages of a thermonuclear bomb. US officials have said that manufacturing the material requires a solvent cleaning agent which is "extremely flammable" and "explosive". The process also involves dealing with "toxic materials" hazardous to workers.

Over the last year the Government Accountability Office (GAO), which reports to the US Congress, has been investigating the W76 refurbishment programme. An unclassified version of its final report was released last week. The GAO report concluded: "NNSA did not effectively manage one of the highest risks of the programme - the manufacture of a key material known as Fogbank - resulting in $69m in cost over-runs and a schedule delay of at least one year that presented significant logistical challenges for the navy."

For the first time, the report described the difficulties faced by the NNSA in trying to make Fogbank. A new production facility was needed at the Y-12 National Security Complex at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, because an old one had been demolished in the 1990s.

But vital information on how Fogbank was actually made had somehow been mislaid. "NNSA had lost knowledge of how to manufacture the material because it had kept few records of the process when the material was made in the 1980s, and almost all staff with expertise on production had retired or left the agency," the report said.

The GAO report also accused the NNSA of having an inconsistent approach to costing the W76 refurbishment programme. The total cost was put at $2.1 billion in 2004, $6.2bn in 2005 and $2.7bn in 2006.

To John Ainslie, the co-ordinator of the Scottish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, it was "astonishing" that the Fogbank blueprints had been lost. "This is like James Bond destroying his instructions as soon as he has read them," he said. "Perhaps the plans for making Fogbank were so secret that no copies were kept. The British warhead is similar to the American version, and so the problems with Fogbank may delay Aldermaston's plans for renewing or replacing Trident."

The NNSA's principal deputy administrator, William Ostendorff, said that the agency "generally agrees" with the findings of the GAO report. He stressed that NNSA was strengthening its management procedures. He added: "As with many processes that implement increased rigour, there is a need for identification of increased funding in order to increase the fidelity in project risk assessment."

UK sources suggested, though, that the US and UK designs were not identical. All the details of exactly how nuclear weapons are put together are classified as top secret in both countries.

A spokesman for the Ministry of Defence told the Sunday Herald: "It is MoD policy not to comment on nuclear warhead design. To do so would, or would be likely to, prejudice national security."

[Ryan Ruck]

StratCom Commander: New Nukes Needed

Nov 22, 2009

The military's top officer in charge of nuclear weapons issued a warning Thursday about the state of the nation's nuclear programs, saying that new nuclear weapons need to be developed and lamenting the declining numbers of nuclear experts and scientists.

Calling the nuclear arsenal the foundation of the nation's strategic deterrence capability, Gen. Kevin Chilton, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, said the military must invest more in the nuclear enterprise.

"First we need to fix the infrastructure that supports our nuclear stockpile," said Chilton, speaking at an Air Force Association conference in Los Angeles. But "we can't just continue to sustain [Cold War weapons] in our inventory. … It's a new world in the 21st century, and we need weapons that were designed for and support the needs of the 21st century."

Of particular concern, Chilton said, is the deterioration of the nation's nuclear laboratories, which he called "decrepit." These laboratories must be modernized in order to attract and retain the scientists needed to sustain a weapons program, he said.

He also said that since the U.S. no longer tests nuclear weapons, the nation must continue to invest in an aggressive stockpile management program to ensure that existing weapons remain reliable and safe.

Chilton warned that the community of nuclear experts has become dangerously small and the military has failed to replenish the talent pool since the 1980s and 1990s.

"We have skipped a generation," he said. "We've got to do something about that."

Chilton credited the 2007 incident at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., in which the Air Force lost track of nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, for returning the military's focus to the nuclear business.

"We had a wakeup call a couple of years ago in the nuclear business … and thank goodness for it," he said.

The reverberations of that incident are still being felt: Two wing commanders at Minot were fired in October because of their failure to bring about sufficient improvement in their units.

[Ryan Ruck]

2011 U.S. Budget to Fund Refurbishing of Nukes

13 Jan 2010

A reliable replacement for the now-dead Reliable Replacement Warhead program will be funded in U.S. President Barack Obama's proposed 2011 budget, said the woman most responsible for killing the RRW in 2008.

Ellen Tauscher, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, said the budget Obama plans to send to Congress Feb. 2 includes "very crucial investment" in the Stockpile Management program. She declined to disclose specific dollar amounts.

Stockpile Management will do what RRW was supposed to do, Tauscher told defense reporters on Jan. 13.

Just three years ago, Tauscher led successful efforts to kill the RRW. At the time, she was a congresswoman from California and chairman of the House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee. Her subcommittee blocked funding for the program in the 2007 and 2008 Defense Authorization Acts.

Tauscher left Congress and joined the Obama administration last June.

The Stockpile Management program would permit the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to "refurbish" aging nuclear warheads to ensure that they still work and are safe, Tauscher said. During refurbishment, features could be added to the warheads to make them theft-proof and more environmentally friendly (), she said.

But the warheads cannot be "improved" in the sense that they are made into more effective weapons, and they cannot be tested by exploding sample warheads.

That is essentially what was intended with the RRW, Tauscher said.

But the RRW evolved into "a toxic concept" after officials in the Bush administration touted it as a program to improve existing warheads, Tauscher said.

"We don't want people believing that we expect to go out and build new weapons," she said. Thus the RRW program became "dangerous" when it came to be perceived as a program to "modernize" rather than "refurbish" warheads.

"We had to get rid of RRW," Tauscher said. The perception that the United States was improving its nuclear arsenal undermined U.S. efforts to convince non-nuclear countries not to seek nuclear weapons and to encourage nuclear-armed nations to shrink their inventories.

Under the Stockpile Management program, the NNSA would maintain the nuclear stockpile without adding to its capabilities, without testing and "without causing people to be concerned about what we are doing," Tauscher said.

Stockpile Management would provide for a "safe, reliable and effective stockpile until we can get to nuclear zero," she said.

Projecting the proper nuclear image is critical to advancing Obama's nuclear disarmament goals, she said.

For now, negotiating a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia is at the center of Obama's nuclear agenda.

The 15-year-old treaty that limits the number of nuclear warheads the United States and Russia can have expired Dec. 5.

Tauscher said negotiations on a new treaty are progressing, but she declined to predict how soon a new agreement might be reached.

The Obama administration began with efforts to "reset the relationship" between the U.S. and Russia, she said. "I am pleased to say that we are very much in a place where we expect we will have [a treaty] that will serve the American people well," she said.

Critics have chided Obama for failing to negotiate a new START treaty before the old one expired.

"We could have made a decision to have a treaty at almost any time, but not one that would meet the standards" that Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have set or that the Senate would ratify, Tauscher said.

"We want a treaty that will serve the president's arms control agenda" and "retake the high road" on arms control issues, she said. "Timing is important, but it's better to get it right than just to get it."

Wow, won’t it be great… A full arsenal of warheads of proven designs, being tinkered with, and no testing what-so-ever being allowed on the "new" ones. Makes me sleep well!

[Ryan Ruck]

Nuke Audits Uncover Shortfalls At 5 Bases

Mar 1, 2010

At least five Air Force bases have made mistakes in how they inventory, store or control access to nuclear weapons-related material, according to an internal investigation.

The Air Force Audit Agency uncovered the shortfalls in July while conducting inspections prompted by the March 2008 discovery that nuclear missile components had been mislabeled as helicopter parts and shipped from Hill Air Force Base, Utah, to Taiwan three years earlier.

The wings cited for not following procedures:

— 341st Missile Wing, Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont.

— 509th Bomb Wing, Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo.

— 99th Air Base Wing, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.

— 377th Air Base Wing, Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M.

— 48th Fighter Wing, RAF Lakenheath, England.

All the problems have been corrected, according to the audit agency.

The findings, however, suggest problems with securing nuclear components could be more widespread than previously thought. On Jan. 27, the Air Force stripped the 898th Munitions Squadron at Kirtland of its nuclear responsibilities to give the unit more time to prepare for a key inspection. No specific incident led to the squadron’s decertification and all nuclear warheads have been accounted for, according to Air Force Materiel Command, the major command that oversees the 898th.

No inventory or control mistakes were found during the audit agency inspections at three other wings: the 498th Nuclear Systems Wing, Kirtland; the 92nd Air Refueling Wing, Fairchild Air Force Base, Wash.; and the 366th Fighter Wing, Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho.

Air Force Times obtained eight base audit reports through a Freedom of Information Act request; requests for two other reports remain outstanding as of Thursday, and other bases may handle nuclear components. The Air Force does not specify which bases have nuclear-related responsibilities.

What the investigations uncovered:

341st Missile Wing, Malmstrom

Airmen missed 48 percent of the 711 nuclear weapons-related materials that should have been tracked in the Air Force-wide inventory.

The shortfalls were blamed on an unnamed officer’s failure to correctly oversee storage procedures. Auditors also cited Materiel Command’s logistics directorate for not providing adequate guidance but did not fault the wing’s airmen because they were following the rules given to them. Among the items not counted in the inventory: gear removed from deactivated missile sites and from systems undergoing routine maintenance.

In response to the audit’s findings, the wing moved all unused nuclear-related items to a secure vault and performed a follow-up inventory accounting for 100 percent of the items.

Malmstrom is responsible for 50 Minuteman III nuclear missiles.

509th Bomb Wing, Whiteman

Airmen put security of nuclear weapons-related material at risk by not correctly controlling access to the vault where components to arm and release nuclear weapons are stored.

The investigation found six airmen with valid badges after they no longer rated them or who had the combination to the vault lock after leaving the unit.

The report faulted the wing’s logistics readiness squadron for not changing the vault combination when people transferred from the unit and for failing to deactivate badges when people no longer needed access to the vault.

In response to the criticism, the base officials changed access rules.

Whiteman is home to the Air Force’s fleet of nuclear-capable B-2 stealth bombers.

99th Air Base Wing, Nellis

The inquiry found the wing had improperly stored 52 classified nuclear-related items in the 57th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron hangar.

The report did not specify how many nuclear-related items the wing was responsible for but placed the total value at about $13 million.

Investigators said a storage area for nuclear items was not clearly designated and keys for storage containers with classified items were not correctly secured or restricted to authorized personnel.

Nellis is home to a variety of fighters, most used for training aircrews advanced skills.

377th Air Base Wing, Kirtland

The report cited wing leadership for being slow to approve an officer to oversee inventory. While the review’s start date was July 13, the wing commander, Col. Michael Duvall, did not appoint an officer until July 22. The investigation noted the wing’s logistics readiness squadron commander had selected an officer to manage the inventory July 10, but the appointment required the commander’s approval.

Auditors also faulted wing personnel for not correctly signing off on three inventory cards used to record that items were identified and correctly stored.

The 377th was praised for 100 percent accounting of the items assigned to it.

In November, after wide-ranging nuclear surety inspections, the 377th and Kirtland’s 498th Nuclear Systems Wing received grades of unsatisfactory from Materiel Command and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency for problems in personnel reliability, maintenance operations and nuclear weapons security.

The 498th maintains nuclear warheads and cruise missiles; the 377th oversees training and installation security for the center, and the DTRA and Air Force Inspection Agency, both at Kirtland.

48th Fighter Wing, RAF Lakenheath

The investigation found wing airmen did not follow rules for performing the inventory.

Airmen should not have been given the serial numbers of items to check for and the wing should not have selected an officer already involved with securing the nuclear goods to oversee the inventory, audits said.

After inspectors pointed out the mistakes, base officials started a second review that accounted for all the wing’s nuclear assets, the audit said.

The wing flies F-15E Strike Eagles, capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons.

[Ryan Ruck]

US Lost Command of One-Ninth of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Arsenal Last Saturday

10/26/2010

President Barack Obama has been informed that the US AIr Force lost complete command and control of one-ninth of their ICBM arsenal last Saturday. Administration officials stressed that the problem was only temporary, but that doesn't mean it wasn't big.

In fact, according to The Atlantic, a military officer briefed on the matter said that they have never experienced something so big: "[w]e can deal with maybe 5, 6, or 7 at a time, but we've never lost complete command and control and functionality of 50 ICBMs."

The US Air Force has declared that there was no danger to the population, while administration officials said that "at no time did the President's ability [to use the nuclear weapons] decrease." Taking one-ninth of the ICBM arsenal off line certainly decreases the President's ability to fully control the US nuclear arsenal.

The ICBM squadron went to "LF Down"—Launch Facilities Down—status, which means that nobody could communicate with the missiles and several security measures—like intrusion and warhead separation alarms—were offline. That seems to contradict the USAF statement about the public not being in danger. If there's the possibility of unauthorized personnel accessing the missiles—no matter if the base was in high alert—there was the possibility of something going wrong, as remote as it could be.

The cause of the failure remains unknown.

Missiles from the 70s

The Minutemen III Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles that suffered the problem are stationed at the F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming, home of the 90th Missile Wing. The LGM-30G Minuteman III—which entered service in 1970— is the bread and butter of the US nuclear attack stockpile. The 78,000-pound ICBM can reach any place in the world at 15,000 miles per hour, delivering up to three 335-kiloton nuclear warheads on its target.

Currently, 450 of these missiles are distributed across Wyoming, North Dakota (Minot Air Force Base, 91st Missile Wing) and Montana (Malmstrom Air Force Base, 341st Missile Wing). The US Air Force plans to keep the missiles up and running until 2040, and have been retrofitted with new features—like new guidance systems—since their initial deployment.

[Ryan Ruck]

Failure Shuts Down Squadron of Nuclear Missiles

10/26/2010

President Obama was briefed this morning on an engineering power failure at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming that took 50 nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), one-ninth of the U.S. missile stockpile, temporarily offline on Saturday.

The base is a main locus of the United States' strategic nuclear forces. The 90th Missile Wing, headquartered there, controls 150 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic nuclear missiles. They're on full-time alert and are housed in a variety of bunkers across several states.

On Saturday morning, according to people briefed on what happened, a squadron of ICBMs suddenly dropped down into what's known as "LF Down" status, meaning that the missileers in their bunkers could no longer communicate with the missiles themselves. LF Down status also means that various security protocols built into the missile delivery system, like intrusion alarms and warhead separation alarms, were offline. In LF Down status, the missiles are still technically launch-able, but they can only be controlled by an airborne command and control platform like the Boeing E-6 NAOC "Kneecap" aircraft, E-4B NAOC aircraft or perhaps the TACAMO fleet, which is primarily used to communicate with nuclear submarines. Had the country been placed on a higher state of nuclear alert, those platforms would be operating automatically because the frequencies used to transmit nuclear codes would be interfacing with separate systems, according to officials.

According to the official, engineers believe that a launch control center computer (LCC), responsible for a package of at least five missiles, usually ten of them, began to "ping" out of sequence, resulting in a surge of "noise" through the system. The LCCs interrogate each missile in sequence, so if they begin to send signals out when they're not supposed to, receivers on the missiles themselves will notice this and send out error codes.

Since LCCs ping out of sequence on occasion, missileers tried quick fixes. But as more and more missiles began to display error settings, they decided to take off-line all five LCCs that the malfunctioning center was connected to. That left 50 missiles in the dark. The missileers then restarted one of the LCCs, which began to normally interrogate the missile transceiver. Three other LCCs were successfully restarted. The suspect LCC remains off-line.

Commanders at the Air Force Base sent warning notices to colleagues at the country's two other nuclear missile command centers, as well as the to the National Military Command Center in Washington. At that point, they did not know what was causing the failure, and they did not know whether other missile systems were experiencing similar symptoms.

According to the official, engineers discovered that similar hardware failures had triggered a similar cascading failure 12 years ago at Minot AFB in North Dakota and Malmstrom AFB in Montana. That piece of hardware is the prime suspect.

The defense official said that there had not been a power failure, though the official acknowledged that that explanation had made its way through public affairs channels. Engineers working on the system presented a draft of their initial findings late this afternoon, the official said.

An administration official, speaking about the president's ability to control nuclear forces, said: "At no time did the president's ability decrease," an administration official said. "

Still, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Michael Mullen, was immediately notified on Saturday, and he, in turn, briefed Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

"We've never had something as big as this happen," a military officer who was briefed on the incident said. Occasionally, one or two might blink out, the officer said, and several warheads are routinely out of service for maintenance. At an extreme, "[w]e can deal with maybe 5, 6, or 7 at a time, but we've never lost complete command and control and functionality of 50 ICBMs."

The military contends that command and control -- "C2" in their parlance -- was not lost.

An Air Force spokesperson, Christy Nolta, said the power failure lasted less than an hour. "There was a temporary interruption and the missiles themselves were always protected by multiple, redundant, safety, security and command and control features. At no time was there any danger to the public," she said.

Another military official said the failure triggered an emergency inspection protocol, and sentries were dispatched to verify in person that all of the missiles were safe and properly protected.

When on alert, the missiles are the property of the U.S. Strategic Command, which controls all nuclear forces. When not on alert status, the missiles are under the control of a subordinate organization, the Global Strike Command,

A White House spokesperson referred questions about the incident to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and to the Air Force. A spokesperson for the Global Strike Command did not immediately respond to questions.

The cause of the failure remains unknown, although it is suspected to be a breach of underground cables deep beneath the base, according to a senior military official.

It is next to impossible for these systems to be hacked, so the military does not believe the incident was caused by malicious actors. A half dozen individual silos were affected by Saturday's failure.

There are about 450 ICBMs in America's nuclear arsenal, some of them bearing multiple warheads. 150 are based at Minot and about 150 are housed at Malmstrom AFB in Montana. The chessboard of nuclear deterrence, a game-theory-like intellectual contraption that dates from the Cold War, is predicated upon those missiles being able to target specific threat locations across the world. If a squadron goes down, that means other missiles have to pick up the slack. The new START treaty would reduce the number of these missiles by 30 percent, but the cuts are predicated upon the health of the current nuclear stockpile, from warhead to delivery system to command and control.

An administration official said that "to make too much out of this would be to sensationalize it. It's not that big of a deal. Everything worked as planned."

Senate Republicans have been pressing Senate Democrats to spend more money ensuring the current strategic nuclear arsenal, which dates to the early 1980s, is ready to go. The treaty requires the vote of two-thirds of the Senate to be ratified.

In 2008, Gates fired the Secretary of the Air Force and its chief of staff after a series of incidents suggested to Gates that the service wasn't taking its nuclear duties seriously enough. At one point, a B-52 bomber flew across the continental U.S. without realizing that its nuclear weapons were "hot."

National Journal's Megan Scully contacted a spokesperson for Sen. Jon Kyl, a top GOP critic of START, who said that "We don't know what happened and why." The spokesperson refused to comment on "media reports."

[vector7]

U.S. Lost Communications With 50 Nukes

Comments (18)

By JULIAN E. BARNES

Communications with some 50 nuclear missiles were disrupted for 45 minutes on Saturday, making it more difficult to launch them and sending the military scrambling to determine the cause of the incident, according to defense officials.

The incident was significant enough that President Barack Obama was briefed on it this week.

A defense official said a power failure disrupted communications between a control center and the missiles at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming.

There was no danger of an accidental launch, officials said, and the Air Force had eyes on the missiles at all times. "There was no threat to the public," said the defense official. The cause of the power failure remains un known, but it is not believed to be malicious.

Adm. Michael Mullen, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, notified Defense Secretary Robert Gates of the incident. The incident was first reported by the Atlantic on its website on Tuesday.

Another official said the cause of the incident was being analyzed. "The missiles were protected by multiple, redundant safety security and control features," said a military official.

In 2008, a series of problems with nuclear weapons and parts, including the accidental transport of a weapon across the U.S., led Defense Secretary Gates to fire the Air Force secretary and chief of staff.

The current Air Force leadership has put more emphasis on improving nuclear readiness and stewardship of the arsenal. It has restored funding, increased the number of inspections, and tried to increase the prestige of airmen and officers working in the nuclear field.

The Atlantic reported that the squadron of ICBMs was in "LF Down" status, which means the airmen in the missile bunkers could not communicate with the missiles.

The missiles still could be launched, but only by airborne command and control platforms. Although the missiles at Warren Air Force base represent a large proportion of the ICBM arsenal, the defense official said that at no time was Mr. Obama without a nuclear-launch capability.

[American Patriot]

/chuckles


No, they didn't "lose communication".

They merely lost one method of communication.

[Ryan Ruck]

Russia Builds Up, U.S. Down

Bill Gertz
May 1, 2013

As the Obama administration prepares to launch a new round of strategic nuclear missile cuts, Russia’s strategic nuclear forces are undergoing a major modernization, according to U.S. officials.

Russia's military announced last month that as part of the nuclear buildup, Moscow later this year will deploy the first of its new intercontinental ballistic missiles called the Yars-M.

Details of the missile are being kept secret, but it has been described as a fifth-generation strategic nuclear system that Russian officials say will be able to penetrate U.S. missile defenses using a new type of fuel that requires a shorter burn time for booster engines.

The solid-fueled, road-mobile ICBM was tested a year ago, and it is said to have an increased payload capacity for a warhead weighing up to 1.5 tons. The range is 6,835 miles. Like earlier mobile missiles known as SS-29s and SS-27s, the new ICBM is expected to have up to 10 multiple, independently targetable warheads.

Retired Russian strategic forces commander Col. Gen. Viktor Yesin has said the Yars-M “is one of the military technological measures that the Russian military-political leadership has devised in response to the development of a global missile-defense system by the Americans.”

Last year, a Russian official explained the new missile’s fuel and anti-missile defense capabilities in an interview with Moskovski Komsomolets. The strategic nuclear weapons specialist said the high-tech fuel “allows for the reduction of the working time of the engines during the boost phase of flight, when it [the missile] is most vulnerable to detection by defensive means.”

“As a result, we achieve the most complex part of the rocket boost so fast that the enemy does not have time to calculate its trajectory and, therefore, cannot destroy it,” the official said. “That is, we can say that our ability to overcome missile defense will be significantly increased.”

Russia also announced last month that it has launched a new research-and-development program for a modernized rail-mobile ICBM. Russia’s Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov told RIA Novosti April 23 that work on this rail-based missile is in the early stages and could be deployed by 2020.

Russia, during the Soviet era, was the first to deploy a rail-mobile nuclear missile system known as the SS-24.

The rail-based missile is being developed by Russia’s Moscow Institute of Thermal, which also is building the new Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missiles, as well as existing land-based Topol ICBMs.

The rail-mobile ICBMs were prohibited under earlier versions of the U.S.-Russia START treaties. However, the 2010 New START treaty did not prohibit rail-mobile basing of missiles, and Moscow is taking advantage of the omission.

In addition to the new strategic missiles, Russia is building a new strategic bomber that is expected to be deployed by 2020.

By comparison, President Obama is expected to announced soon that he will seek a new round of talks with Russia aimed at cutting U.S. nuclear forces even further than the 1,550 deployed warheads under the 2020 New START treaty.

The cuts are expected to be justified under a Pentagon strategic review that was completed months ago but withheld from release. That report is expected to suggest that U.S. warhead levels could be cut to as few as 1,000, causing critics to say the administration is undermining U.S. deterrence and the ability to extend the nuclear umbrella to European and Asian allies.

Rep. Mike Rogers, Alabama Republican and chairman of the House Armed Services subcommittee on strategic forces, said in a recent speech that the administration is short between $1 billion and $1.6 billion that was promised in 2010 for nuclear modernization.

Among nuclear programs in trouble are a new strategic submarine, life extension programs for B-61, W-76 and W-88 nuclear warheads and a long-range standoff nuclear cruise missile. A needed plutonium facility in New Mexico was also canceled, Mr. Rogers said.

The Pentagon also postponed a test launch of a Minuteman III ICBM last month over concerns that it might be misconstrued as an attack on North Korea, which threatened nuclear missile attacks on the United States.

“I find this deeply concerning, given the sorry state of the nuclear modernization commitments made during the last round,” Mr. Rogers said of plans for additional nuclear cuts.

The Pentagon also has signaled a further lack of resolve toward its nuclear modernization program by ordering an environmental impact study of shutting down an entire land-based nuclear-missile wing.

“New START doesn’t require shutting down a missile wing, and I have heard no explanation for this requested study,” Mr. Rogers said.

[American Patriot]

“As a result, we achieve the most complex part of the rocket boost so fast that the enemy does not have time to calculate its trajectory and, therefore, cannot destroy it,” the official said. “That is, we can say that our ability to overcome missile defense will be significantly increased.”
Bullshit....

[Ryan Ruck]

Pentagon Weighs Whether to Hang Onto or Replace Aging ICBMs

April 18, 2013

The U.S. Defense Department is weighing the feasibility of extending the service life of the nation’s aging Minuteman 3 ICBMs versus replacing them in coming decades with brand new nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.

The 450 Minuteman 3s are expected to last through 2030, but might be retained longer if they can be further refurbished, senior Pentagon officials said at a Senate hearing on Wednesday. The weapons were first deployed in 1970 and sit on alert in underground silos at three different bases in Montana, North Dakota and Wyoming.

The Air Force, which fields and maintains the missiles, is “very carefully analyzing exactly how the current system is degrading, so that they have a much better understanding of how they might extend the life of this [ICBM], if that is the alternative that’s chosen,” Madelyn Creedon, assistant Defense secretary for global affairs, told the Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee in testimony alongside other civilian and military leaders.

The analysis, which is to begin in July after some “bureaucratic delays,” will conclude late next year, said Lt. Gen. James Kowalski, who heads Air Force Global Strike Command. The assessment will examine whether to undertake a “program to further extend the life of the Minuteman 3 or to develop a follow-on ICBM,” Creedon elaborated in her written testimony.

Many details about the various modernization options and their projected costs -- first examined in an initial Capabilities Based Assessment finalized last October -- remain classified. However, officials say key factors under study include whether to place any new ICBMs in fixed launch silos or make them mobile on trucks or other vehicles; which warhead to mate with the delivery vehicles; and how to modernize these systems most affordably.

Whether the country’s future ICBM -- dubbed the “Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent -- is an updated Minuteman or a totally new design, it appears the missile will share quite a bit of hardware in common with the Navy’s future ballistic missile for basing aboard submarines, Defense officials say.

Which option ultimately is selected, according to experts, might come down to a question that many automobile owners would find familiar: Does it make more sense to save upfront investment by continuing to operate an old design with swapped-out parts and upgrades, or to invest instead in a new system with more up-to-date design efficiencies that could be easier to maintain in the long run?

Another question facing the Minuteman 3’s overseers and custodians is whether the missiles, even after some recent renovations, could actually function through 2030. At the hearing, Senator Deb Fischer (R-Neb.) asked if the Minuteman might age out sooner unless near-term steps are taken to extend its service life.

“I am confident we can get the missile, as it is, to 2030 with the programs that we have in place, or the programs that we don’t have funded yet but plan to pursue in the next couple years,” responded Kowalski, whose command is based in Louisiana.

For example, he said, there is some question about whether the casings around the missile propellant might degrade early, a possibility that could lead to leaks or malfunctions. If the existing propulsion unit lasts an estimated 30 years, no refurbishment would be needed until 2025 or later, he said. However, less longevity in the technology could demand earlier intervention.

Of the Minuteman’s three rocket stages, the third motor is attracting most concern. However, there is no indication to date of any degradation of the materials with which it is made -- not even any “adverse trends” -- which has led many officials to conclude that the already overhauled propulsion system might even last a half-decade or more beyond an estimated 30-year lifespan, one issue expert said.

The expert asked not to be named in discussing the sensitive issue of how long a nuclear-armed system might remain viable.

The Minuteman 3 missile guidance system also could require a service-life extension between now and 2030, Kowalski said.

This, too, is a question under internal debate, according to the issue expert. The Air Force estimate is that the current guidance system -- which helps direct a warhead to its target -- will function for another 17 years. However, some have raised questions about whether existing electronics might fail earlier and should be traded out for updated replacements, this source said.

Kowalski noted in written testimony that the overall service life initially anticipated for the Minuteman 3 was just 10 years, but the missile has since “proven its value in deterrence well beyond the platform’s intended lifespan."

The Air Force is studying how any near-term maintenance for the deployed Minuteman 3s, if needed, would relate to the missile’s eventual replacement, the commander said at the hearing.

“All of the things that we plan to invest in the Minuteman 3 are specific subsystems that we intend to dovetail into the ground-based strategic deterrent, the follow-on [ICBM],” said the three-star general, adding that the Pentagon intends to ensure “we are not paying for the same thing twice.”

Some have suggested the United States might safely eliminate the ICBM leg of the nation’s nuclear triad, and rely instead on a combination of dual-capable, nuclear-conventional bomber aircraft and ballistic missiles aboard highly survivable submarines at sea.

However, Kowalski suggested that as the capability to field atomic arms and ballistic missiles proliferates around the globe, Washington’s ICBM arsenal remains a crucial bulwark against possible nuclear blackmail or coercion threats.

“There are 450 hardened launch facilities in the heartland of this country,” he said. “And if we did not have those, we’d need to think through what that scenario looks like in 15 or 20 years.”

Creedon was asked about a recent Obama administration decision to avoid further escalating tensions with North Korea by rescheduling a Minuteman 3 test launch from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., which had been slated for last week.

“We decided it was wise to postpone for a while the last launch because of the situation on the Korean Peninsula,” she said. “It was a situation that we just wanted to deal with in a way that we didn’t increase the provocation cycle” in the region, she said.

Plans are now for the next Minuteman 3 test flight to occur between May 21 and 23, which would effectively resume the normal launch schedule where it left off, Creedon said.

[Ryan Ruck]

Air Force Nuclear Missile Unit Fails Key Security Test, In Latest Setback

August 13, 2013

An Air Force unit responsible for dozens of nuclear missiles failed a recent safety and security inspection -- a setback that comes just months after the Air Force temporarily sidelined 17 officers in connection with a prior inspection flop.

The latest failure was recorded by the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont. According to Air Force Global Strike Command, the unit received an "unsatisfactory" rating during the inspection in early August after personnel made "tactical-level errors" during an exercise.

"This failure resulted in the entire inspection being graded 'unsatisfactory,'" a statement from Global Strike Command said.

Commander Lt. Gen. Jim Kowalski stressed in the statement that the failure does not mean the safety of America's nuclear arsenal is at risk, and that the inspections are "designed to be tough."

But the failure comes on top of other disappointing news for the Air Force's nuclear weapons force.

Last spring the 91st Missile Wing at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., received weak grades on an inspection but did not fail it outright; that performance was so poor, however, that 17 officers temporarily lost their authority to operate missiles.

The group's deputy commander said at the time it was suffering "rot" within its ranks.

"We are, in fact, in a crisis right now," the commander, Lt. Col. Jay Folds, wrote in an internal email.

The unit in Montana that was the focus of the latest inspection is responsible for 150 Minuteman 3 nuclear missiles that stand on 24/7 alert for potential launch against targets around the globe.

Kowalski, who spoke with the Associated Press, would not discuss details of the failure or explain the exercise, citing security, except to say that it did not involve the crews who monitor the missiles from inside underground launch control capsules. That left open the possibility that it involved airmen responsible for security, weapons maintenance or other aspects of the highly sensitive mission.

"This unit fumbled on this exercise," Kowalski told the AP by telephone from his headquarters at Barksdale Air Force Base, La.

[Ryan Ruck]

Military Removes Nuclear Weapons Unit Commander; Decision Follows Security Failure

August 25, 2013

The Air Force has removed the commander of a nuclear weapons unit at a Montana base following a failed safety and security inspection.

Military leaders say the decision to relieve Col. David Lynch of command at Malmstrom Air Force Base stems from a loss of confidence. They say it is not the result of the failed inspection first reported by The Associated Press on Aug. 13.

This is the second time in recent months that an Air Force nuclear commander was replaced following a high-profile security misstep.

Lt. Col. Randy Olson was relieved of duty at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., in June.

The AP first reported an unprecedented sidelining of 17 launch officers there in May following an exceptionally poor review in the spring.