US Navy Decommissions Three More ASW Squadrons; Future of ASW Aviation in Doubt

[Ryan Ruck]

US Navy Decommissions Three More ASW Squadrons; Future of ASW Aviation in Doubt

OPNAV NOTICE 3111 29 Nov 05

From: Chief of Naval Operations

To: All COMPATWING

UNCLAS

1. Purpose: To approve disestablishment of subject fleet activities, all under the administrative command of the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. Background: The disestablishment of PATRON SIX FIVE (VP-65), PATRON SIX SIX (VP-66), and PATRON NINE FOUR (VP-94) are in compliance with the Active Reserve Integration (ARI) plan. In addition, P-3 aircraft fatigue issues have required the grounding of 30 aircraft during CY 05, necessitating an accelerated disestablishment plan to recapitalize scarce aircraft resources.

3. Organizational Changes: Effective 31 March 2006, disestablish VP-65, VP-66 and VP-94.

VP-65 is in Point Mugu, CA. VP-66 in Willow Grove, PA. VP-94 in New Orleans, LA. None of the three squadrons had any aircraft left on the ramp (emphasis added - Ed.). Their 12 P-3s were already on temp loan to active squadrons. All 12 will be transferred no later than 01 Feb 06 to either the active fleet or the boneyard at Davis Monthan AFB. IMRL gear and SE are already in process of being shipped to other locations.

This will reduce the Reserve P-3 force to a total of 18 P-3 aircraft in CY 06.

MESSAGE ENDS

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This is nearly catastrophic regarding the Navy's long-range patrol aviation and ASW capabilities. This memo confirms rumors heard earlier that the Navy now has less than 100 flyable P-3C aircraft, down from 288 in 2003. Stress tests on remaining aircraft made engineers wet their pants. The theoretical max safe wing loading at this point had been calculated to be 3.7Gs. When tested, however, detectible fractures began occuring at 2.8Gs -- what you get in a moderately hard landing or on station in turbulence.

In 2005 alone, the US Navy has contracted with a number of companies, including, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, L-3 Communications, and Logistics Services International for a total of over $249 million just for structural inspections and repair, principally the wings.

The P-8A, recently chosen to replace the P-3C beginning in 2013, is estimated to cost the Navy as much as $45 billion -- money the Navy does not have. Attempts to get allied countries to partner with the US in developing the P-8 for a relatively paltry $300 million each have so far failed. While the Navy has yet to announce the per unit price for the P-8, it is this author's belief that the ongoing war on terrorism and the Navy's clear shift of emphasis to the DD(X), CVN(X), and LCS will starve the P-8 project to the point that no more than 50 will be eventually produced for the US. Fifty would be enough to equip two squadrons at NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND and two squadrons at NAS JACKSONVILLE with eight aircraft each, plus an additional twelve or so for the RAG at VP-30. However, it is not inconceivable that the program will be defunded entirely and US Navy long range patrol aviation be allowed to die a quiet death. Indeed, as the fourth generation AIP-equipped diesel-electric subs quietly spread across the Third World, the future of US Navy air ASW may rest with the helicopter fleet, aided by surface ships, US subs, and the single fastest-growing weapon in our arsenal, Unmanned Vehicles.

[Ryan Ruck]

US Navy Struggles to Recapture, Keep ASW Proficiency

In the past several years the US Navy has reacquired an urgency about anti-submarine warfare. A poor step-child of the Navy since the fall of the USSR (along with mine-hunting), ASW is once again being recognized as a critical capability.

Of the more than 10,000 hours flown by Navy P-3Cs in the Persian Gulf, none of this time involved ASW. Rather, the missions involved supporting ground troops in Iraq and performing maritime interception operations as part of the coalition's stopping illegal smuggling of oil. While meeting the current needs of the service after essentially abandoning ASW after the collapse of the USSR, the world’s navies – the US Navy in the forefront -- find themselves ill-equipped to counter the explosive growth in the Third World fleet of stealthy, fourth generation diesel-electric subs like the U-212/214-class and the Scorpene-class. Such current technology subs can stay submerged for days without need for snorkeling. Equipped with Air Independent Propulsion closed-oxygen diesel drives that burn ethanol and liquid oxygen to make steam to drive a turbo-electric generator, the design permits retrofitting into existing submarines by adding an extra hull section. Typical cost for a new submarine powered by AIP is $250 million. These warships are openly for sale to almost anyone with a big enough checking account (except Taiwan, but that’s another story). For the budget-conscious – or someone simply in a hurry to raise hell with an allied navy -- a Russian P-130 or Piranha-T Small-class submarine may be purchased for a fraction of the cost of a Scorpene. In the past several years, both US and allied forces have been dismayed to have their ships “sunk” (including an aircraft carrier) by small but new diesel-electric submarines such as Sweden’s “Gotland” playing the enemy in exercises.

Recognizing this large hole in national defense, the US Navy in 2004 stood up the Fleet ASW Command and allocated more money to oversee ASW training. In addition to a new generation of active sonobouys, the Navy is working on such advanced technologies as floating sensor grids and other networked, distributed systems that operate without a vessel or aircraft nearby. The P-8A aircraft, to replace the P-3C (and perhaps the EP-3E as well) has been in development for several years, although its eventual production in sufficient numbers to do the job remains in serious doubt.

In late 2005, the Navy released additional information regarding current and foreseeable multiple missions with a smaller, more disperse maritime patrol and reconnaissance force – today’s P-3Cs and the promised P-8A replacement. The Navy’s fleet of operational P-3Cs has decreased from a listed 227 in 2003 to just 150 by mid- 2005, with 54 of these grounded for serious maintenance or re-winging (the P-3 was designed for a service life of 20,000 hours; many are now pushing 30,000 hours and are 40 years old, flogging through the harsh, unforgiving environment of salt water spray and constant low-level flight). The P-8A isn’t scheduled to hit the fleet starting in 2013 and replacing the last P-3C in 2019. Whether the Navy buys the P-8 as the replacement for the EP-3E is unknown. The Army recently rejected the ERJ-145 planned replacement for the Aerial Common Sensor Aircraft. The 145 was to have served both the Army and the Navy.

The critical shortage of P-3Cs has resulted in an almost total cessation of training when a squadron returns home from deployment as most of its aircraft are quickly cycled back to the fleet for overseas operations. In 1991 the Navy had 25 active and 13 reserve VP squadrons, each with nine airplanes. Today it has 12 active operational and six reserve squadrons, with all reserve squadrons to have been decommissioned by 2007. There are simply no aircraft to spare for the reserves any longer. Today, the Navy is down to just three deployment sites with each squadron having just eight airplanes each, a total of 24 planes. With the P-8 still just a drawing, the future of US Navy patrol aviation is in serious doubt at a time when the threat from Middle Eastern diesel-electric subs is ever more intense. The Navy’s decommissioning of its S-3B squadrons leaves the fleet even more vulnerable to this threat. Further, the P-8 is a big airplane unsuitable for the low-level (i.e. 200 feet over the water) active prosecution tactics used by the P-3 with such sensors as MAD. Instead, the Navy is planning to go with such untested upgrades as a new generation of extended echo range (EER) active (pinger) sonobouys, each equipped with GPS so as to have a constantly updated tactical plot.

While -- according to the Navy’s ASW Command/Fleet Replacement Patrol Squadron THIRTY -- ASW is still the primary mission focus for P-3s, annual ASW training done at the squadron level is approximately one-third of that conducted twenty years ago.

As the Navy plans for a fleet of perhaps 265 warships (down from 586 in 1988 and the smallest Navy since 1912), it states that the P-8A is fully funded through fleet introduction planned for 2012-2013. Full funding for replacement of the P-3C is yet to occur and not a sure thing, especially as the War on Terrorism is likely to continue into the foreseeable future. The Navy admits that even today’s 12 active VP squadrons are “likely to decrease” in number. This reporter estimates a total of four active P-8 squadrons plus a fifth fleet replacement squadron. Each active squadron (there will be no reserve VP squadrons) is likely to have eight aircraft. With another twelve or so for the FRS, we are likely to see, at best, fifty P-8 aircraft trying to do the job of over 200 P-3Cs. Look for UAVs to assume an ever greater portion of military aviation. While the outlook for success under this plan is clouded, the danger posed by enemy submarines is sharply defined.